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Technocratic judgments can have a “cooling function.” An insistent focus on the 
facts, and on the likely consequences of policies, might soften political divisions 
and produce consensus. Within the federal government, cost-benefit analysis is a 
prominent example of the cooling function of technocracy. But when undertaken 
prospectively, such analysis is sometimes speculative and can be error-prone; in 
addition, circumstances change, often in unanticipated ways. For this reason, 
retrospective analysis, designed to identify the actual rather than expected effects, 
has significant advantages. The “regulatory lookback,” first initiated in 2011 and 
undertaken within and throughout the executive branch, has considerable promise 
for simplifying the regulatory state, reducing cumulative burdens, and increasing 
net benefits. It deserves a prominent place in the next generation of regulatory 
practice. Recent history also suggests that it might well soften political divisions. 
 
I.  The Cooling Function of Technocracy 
 
In 2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) eliminated certain 
restrictions of the use of electronic technologies – tablets, cell phones, and computers – at 
various stages of flights.
1 The FAA’s decision was widely hailed; it did not provoke 
partisan divisions. Across the United States, travelers agreed that the decision would 
significantly increase convenience and remove irritating restrictions that had significant 
aggregate costs. The scientific evidence also seemed clear: The restrictions that the FAA 
eliminated were pointless and did not contribute to safety. The FAA’s deregulatory 
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∗ Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This essay, produced as a keynote 
lecture for a symposium at Boston University and forthcoming in the Boston University Law 
Review, draws heavily on chapter 7 of Simpler: The Future of Government (Simon & Schuster, 
2013). (Many thanks to Simon & Schuster for permission to do so.) Readers are asked to make 
allowances for the occasional informality of an essay that is based on an oral presentation and on 
a chapter intended for a popular audience. Special thanks to Matthew Lipka for superb research 
assistance and valuable comments. 
1 See 
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/m
edia/2013/InFO13010.pdf  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360277 
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efforts, part of the continuing “regulatory lookback,” created substantial benefits without 
imposing significant costs.   
 
Amidst political polarization, it is often helpful to focus on facts – on what, 
exactly, is known or at least knowable. Careful assessment of facts, and projection of 
likely consequences, can have a cooling function. That assessment can help to reduce 
political divisions, even in periods of intense polarization. Under favorable conditions, 
technocrats inform and discipline politicians and their constituents, by clarifying the 
stakes. To be sure, it is far from impossible to argue with numbers, but it can be hard to 
do so, and once that particular argument begins, people tend to know what it is that they 
are arguing about. By itself, that is important progress. 
 
From 2009 to 2012, I was privileged to serve as Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs. In that capacity, I learned that close attention to the 
human consequences, and indeed to costs and benefits, can help to promote both 
consensus and progress in domains in which both of these might otherwise prove difficult 
to achieve. President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563,
2 ratifying and intensifying the 
longstanding American commitment to careful analysis of costs and benefits,
3 can be 
understood as an effort to reduce attention to intuitions, dogmas, political posturing, and 
interest groups, and instead to focus public officials on what matters, which are the 
effects of potential policies on the human beings who are subject to them.
4 
 
Some people are likely to doubt the view that technocracy can have a cooling 
function. In their view, debates about policies and regulations are really debates about 
values, not about facts. When people disagree about a rule that would protect clean air or 
increase highway safety, it is because of what they most value, not because of 
disagreements about the evidence. Facts are not irrelevant, but they are hardly the main 
event.  
 
A great deal of evidence does show that with respect to policies and regulations, 
values sometimes have priority.
5 If people have certain predispositions, they will be 
inclined to believe that climate change is a serious problem, that nanotechnology is 
dangerous, that nuclear power is a bad idea, and that gun control saves lives. If they have 
different predispositions, they will be inclined to the opposite beliefs. Predispositions 
with respect to values help to account for people’s factual judgments on these and many 
other questions. If we are asking what, in fact, explains people’s disagreements about 
facts, one answer would be their disagreements about values. 
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2 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,563], 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601 (Supp. V 2011). 
3 See Exec. Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
4 For discussion, see Sunstein, supra note *. 
5 Dan Kahan and his coauthors have done a great deal of valuable work on this topic. See THE 
CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL (last visited Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/kahan/. 	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But it is important not to overstate the point. Most people’s values do not lead to a 
clear judgment about whether to ban the use of tablets in flights, or whether to require 
rearview cameras in cars. (Do they reduce accidents? By how much?) By themselves, 
values do not tell us whether we should reduce levels of ozone in the ambient air from 75 
parts per billion to 70 parts per billion or 65 parts per billion, or for that matter 20 parts 
per billion. (Would such reductions have significant health benefits, or not?) Taken by 
themselves, values do not answer the question whether we should increase the fuel 
economy of cars to 40 miles per gallon (MPG) or 50 MPG or 60 MPG or 70 MPG, and 
whether we should do so by 2020 or 2025.  
 
To answer these questions, the facts are indispensable. For fuel economy, it is 
necessary to know what consumers will gain, and what they will lose, and what the likely 
effects will be on air quality and on energy security. Abstractions, intuitions, party 
affiliation, dogmas, and inclinations are hopelessly inadequate. This is an opportunity, 
not a problem. If regulators discover that a proposed fuel economy rule would not much 
benefit consumers or the environment but would add $900 to the cost of every new car, 
they have learned enough to know that the rule will be exceedingly hard to defend. After 
they learn such facts, those previously inclined to favor the rule might well change their 
minds. And if we know (hypothetically) that a rule requiring rearview cameras in cars 
would prevent many deaths (say, nine hundred per year) and cost very little (say, $1 per 
car), the argument for that rule would be hard to resist.  
 
Of course, any such judgments will depend on at least some kind of consensus 
about values. Suppose that some people have extreme or idiosyncratic values, suggesting, 
for example, that increased costs are independently and intrinsically good, or that 
exceedingly high monetary values should be given to even very small improvements in 
air quality, or that what most matters is the downfall of capitalism. In the face of such 
values, agreement will be difficult to achieve. And of course, people’s values do differ 
even if no one is being extreme or idiosyncratic. In some cases, their values, and their 
competing political allegiances, will lead in competing directions no matter what the 
evidence says.  
 
What I am emphasizing here is the opposite point, and the more interesting and 
neglected one: when the evidence is clear, it will often lead people to the same conclusion 
even if those very people differ intensely with respect to values. If a regulation would 
save many lives and cost very little, people are likely to support it regardless of their 
party identification; and if a regulation would produce little benefit but impose significant 
costs, citizens are unlikely to favor it regardless of whether they like elephants or 
donkeys. A great advantage of careful analysis is that it can weaken the hold of 
antecedent convictions, which sometimes operate in a factual vacuum.  
 
The executive branch has particular advantages here, because of the existence of 
institutional arrangements that have long prized such analysis.
6 Insofar as executive 
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6 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013); John Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and 
Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2001).  	 ﾠ 4 
agencies have a degree of policymaking discretion under relevant statutes, their ability to 
investigate the facts, to consider a range of options, and to assess the costs and benefits of 
each can make the cooling functioning of technocracy an institutional reality. 
 
II. Looking Forward, Looking Back 
 
It is unfortunate but true that if undertaken in advance, projections of costs and 
benefits will sometimes rest on highly speculative assumptions. This is a significant 
qualification to the claim that technocratic judgments can have a cooling function, and it 
helps to account for contemporary divisions in the regulatory domain.  
 
In important cases, public officials may not be able to specify, with confidence, 
the costs of a rule that would require reductions in air pollution, or the benefits of a rule 
that would reduce risks of injuries in coalmines. Sometimes the most that can be done is 
to identify “ranges” for both benefits and costs, and those ranges can be fairly wide. Cost 
estimates of $200 million to $400 million are not unusual.
7 Benefits estimates on the 
order of one thousand lives saved to two thousand lives saved are not hard to find.
8 In 
addition, the ranges themselves may be either too optimistic or too pessimistic. Costs 
may turn out to be far higher than anticipated; the same is true of benefits.
9 In addition, 
circumstances might change. Reasonable assumptions, accepted by relevant officials in 
advance, might be undermined by technological changes, private adaptation, or other 
factors.  
 
When the relevant ranges are narrow, or when agencies can come up with 
something close to point estimates, technocracy can indeed have a cooling function. But 
when ranges are wide, a degree of political contestation is inevitable, and disagreements 
may well become heated and difficult to resolve. With respect to assumptions that 
generate either low or high benefits or costs, many people will be mind-numbingly 
predictable (especially in Washington, DC, and especially if their economic self-interest 
or ideological goals are at stake) -- with industry groups (unfailingly) contending that the 
benefits are at the low end of the range and costs at the high end, and with public interest 
groups (unfailingly) arguing exactly the opposite. In part because the relevant sources 
almost always reach the anticipated conclusions, they cannot be entirely trusted.  
 
A. Inconsistent Dogmas 
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7 For examples, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 167 (2013). 
8 Id. 
9 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, VALIDATING 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 
41-46 (2005) (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_re
port.pdf (collecting studies comparing ex ante and ex post analyses of regulations’ costs and 
benefits, including examples where cost and benefit estimates were off by more than a factor of 
ten). 	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As OIRA administrator, I was often told that with respect to costs and benefits, 
regulators err in predictable directions. The problem is that the people who told me that 
offered radically (and almost comically) inconsistent stories when making their point.  
 
Within the business community, not to mention the Republican Party and 
conservative think tanks, many intelligent people share a single view: government 
agencies are far too optimistic, even self-serving, about both benefits and costs.
10 When I 
spoke on one occasion to a group of small businesses, an executive asked me with 
complete exasperation, “How can we possibly trust cost-benefit analysis when agencies 
keep lowballing the costs?” Many conservatives told me (and continue to tell me) that 
agencies cook their numbers so as to make their rules appear far better than they actually 
are. In their view, agencies are irredeemably self-interested; they want to justify their 
rules and so tweak or twist the numbers to provide that justification. In short, regulators 
cannot be trusted. Their policy preferences are driving their numbers, rather than vice 
versa, or so the story goes.  
 
Within the public interest community (especially among environmentalists), not 
to mention the Democratic Party and liberal think tanks, many intelligent people hold 
precisely the opposite beliefs. When I was speaking on one occasion to a group of 
committed environmentalists, one of them asked me, with real frustration, “How can we 
rely on cost-benefit analysis, when the costs are always inflated?” Many progressives 
believe that agencies systematically underestimate the benefits and exaggerate the costs.
11  
 
Time and again, environmentalists told me that the real benefits are far greater 
than agencies estimate and that the real costs are a great deal lower. They pointed out that 
agencies have to depend on industry for cost estimates. (This is true; industries often have 
most of the relevant data, and government may have to rely on what industries tell them, 
at least for starters). This reliance, many environmentalists contend, results in significant 
overstatements of what companies will actually pay after rules are placed on the books. 
To public interest groups, agency cost estimates sometimes amount to, or at least draw 
on, industry scare tactics. In the real world, rules will impose only a small fraction of the 
projected costs, or so the story goes.  
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10 See, e.g., Si Kyung Seong & John Mendeloff, Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA's Projections of 
the Benefits of New Safety Standards, 45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 313, 324-28 (2004) (finding that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration consistently overestimates regulatory benefits); 
Sherzod Abdukadirov, Regulatory Benefits: Examining Agency Justification For New 
Regulations 22-23 (Mercatus Institute, Working Paper No. 12-37, 2012) (stating that many 
regulations overestimate benefits). 
11 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1071,1082-84 (2006) (“The evidence is clear: the costs of environmental protection are much 
more often overestimated, rather than underestimated, in advance.”); David M. Driesen, The 
Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 600 (1997) (“Studies comparing regulatory cost estimates with actual 
compliance costs show that regulators consistently overestimate costs.”). 	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Both camps can cite apparently convincing examples. In the Obama 
administration, some proposed rules were withdrawn because agencies were ultimately 
convinced that the costs would be considerably higher than they expected. For example, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration withdrew a highly controversial rule 
designed to protect workers from excessive noise.
12 It did so in part on the ground that it 
appeared to have underestimated the costs.
13  
 
On some occasions, other agencies have given unrealistically low estimates of the 
burdens imposed by paperwork and reporting requirements. Real people have to spend 
real time on those requirements, even if they seem simple and easy to navigate to those 
who wrote them. There have been significant efforts to reform the Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form so as to increase the likelihood that students who 
need financial help will be able to attend college.
14 But some specialists argue that those 
efforts do not go nearly far enough, and that even now, the FAFSA form requires 
significantly more time and effort than the Department of Education projects.
15 
 
On the other hand, agencies have sometimes offered inflated cost estimates. The 
Clean Air Act requires companies to reduce acid rain.
16 Originally the Environmental 
Protection Agency projected that this requirement would impose high costs, and industry 
contended that the costs would be actually much higher than the EPA projected. It turned 
out that the costs were significantly lower.
17 In many cases, moreover, industries learn a 
great deal over time, and costs fall for that reason, in ways that agencies may not be able 
to anticipate. The expense of a requirement today may be much higher than the expense 
of the same requirement tomorrow, in part because of cost-reducing innovations spurred 
by the regulation itself. Focusing on just this point, the Department of Energy has been 
rethinking its cost projections for rules requiring energy efficiency.
18 In its view, a 
“learning curve” analysis is needed to produce accurate numbers. Because industry learns 
how to do things more efficiently, innovation often drives anticipated costs way down. 
 
Without a doubt, those with an incentive to oppose rules will tend to overstate the 
costs and perhaps even claim that if rules are finalized, terrible dislocations will occur. I 
saw such overstatements at least one a month. I also saw professional civil servants at 
agencies, working with OIRA and other offices within the government, trying to generate 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor's OSHA Withdraws 




14 See Susan Dynarski & Mark Wiederspan, Student Aid Simplification (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17834, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17834. 
15 Id. 
16 A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR (2000). 
17 See id. 
18 See Paul Voosen, For Energy Efficiency, Chu’s Law Is On the Way, GREENWIRE (June 14, 
2012), http://eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/06/14/1; Energy Conservation Program: Energy 
Conservation Standards for Residential Refrigerators, Refrigerator-Freezers, and Freezers, 76 
Fed. Reg. 57,516 (Sept. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 	 ﾠ 7 
the right numbers. But if industry overstates costs, regulators may not have enough 
information to make a correction. 
 
While the polarized positions divide most often on costs, benefits matter too, and 
they produce identical divisions. Do government agencies overstate or underestimate 
them? Industry representatives frequently argue that benefits are wildly exaggerated and 
highly speculative. Public interest groups frequently argue that benefits are 
underestimated, especially in light of the fact that many are hard to quantify and are 





Whether agencies systematically understate or overstate benefits and costs is an 
empirical question. In principle, the answer to that question is knowable. Researchers 
have started to try to answer it. A great deal remains to be learned, but current findings do 
not support either of the polar positions. It turns out that both industry and the public 
interest community have a great deal of confidence in evidence-free dogmas. 
 
Consider, for example, Winston Harrington’s careful study, building on previous 
work, which explores sixty-one rules for which benefit-cost ratios could be compared 
before and after the fact.
20 Harrington found no systematic bias. In his account, agencies 
overestimated both benefits and costs with about equal frequency. Specifically, in sixteen 
of the sixty-one cases, the ratios were found to be essentially accurate. In twenty-four 
cases, the ratio was better, not worse, than the agency had anticipated. In twenty-one 
cases, the ratio was worse than anticipated. Harrington’s general conclusion is that while 
both costs and benefits tend to be lower than estimated, no bias can be found in estimates 
of benefit-cost ratios.  
 
Harrington’s study focuses on benefit-cost ratios, which is a relevant question but 
not the central one. What most matters is net benefits and whether agencies have 
accurately calculated them.
21 Nor did Harrington specify the degree to which benefits and 
costs were underestimated or overestimated. Other studies do not isolate the net benefits 
question, but they do explore the question of underestimation or overestimation. One 
such study analyzed twenty-five environmental and occupational safety regulations for 
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19 Compare Laurie T. Johnson & Chris Hope, The Social Cost of Carbon in U.S. Regulatory 
Impact Analyses: An Introduction and Critique, 2 J. ENVTL. STUD. SCI. 205 (2012) (finding that 
the government underestimates the benefits of limiting carbon, where one author was a Natural 
Resources Defense Council economist), and Mark Drajem, Obama Agrees to Open Carbon-Cost 
Estimate to Outside Comment, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-04/obama-agrees-to-open-carbon-cost-estimate-to-
outside-comment.html (describing complaints by industry lobbyists that the government’s 
estimate of the benefits of reducing carbon pollution is exaggerated). 
20 Winston Harrington, Grading Estimates of the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation 
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 06-39, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=937357. 
21 For an explanation, see Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note. 	 ﾠ 8 
which retrospective estimates could be found.
 22 The basic conclusion is that agencies 
display a modest tendency to overestimate costs (a finding in support of the progressive 
view). For twelve rules, agencies overestimated costs; they estimated costs accurately for 
five; they underestimated for two; and the costs were indeterminate for six.
23 
 
In 2005, the Office of Management and Budget, and in particular the OIRA staff, 
provided an overview of many retrospective analyses based on an examination of forty-
seven case studies.
24 The overview offers three key conclusions. First, agencies were far 
more likely to overestimate benefits than to underestimate them.
25 More particularly, 
agencies overestimated benefits 40 percent of the time, whereas they underestimated 
benefits only 2 percent of the time. Second, agencies tended to overestimate the benefit-
cost ratio, and in that sense to be a bit too optimistic about the consequences of their 
rules; agency estimates were accurate 23 percent of the time, while the ratio was 
overestimated 47 percent of the time and underestimated 30 percent of the time. Third, 
agencies were slightly more likely to overestimate than to underestimate costs; agencies 
were accurate 26 percent of the time, overestimated  costs 34 percent of the time, and 
underestimated costs 26 percent of the time.
26  
 
From existing work, the most sensible general conclusion is that neither of the 
competing dogmas can be supported by the evidence. Agencies do make many mistakes, 
but there does not appear to be a systematic bias in one or another direction. That is 
useful and important to know. But it is even more important to acknowledge that we need 
to know a great deal more than we now do. The existing studies cover only a very small 
fraction of rules on the books. Much more can and should be done to compare 
prospective estimates to what actually happens in the world. We certainly know that 
some rules work less well than anticipated and that others work much better. Armed with 
an understanding of how rules are working in fact, we should be in a much better position 
to decide how to proceed—and in many cases, to streamline, improve, and even eliminate 
existing requirements.  
 
III. The Regulatory Lookback 
 
A sensible regulatory system, dedicated to empirical analysis and designed to 
transcend partisan divisions, would go beyond the competing dogmas. It would track 
reality. A key question is whether particular rules should be revised, simplified, 
strengthened, expanded, or eliminated in light of what we learn about what those rules are 
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22 Winston Harrington, Richard Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, How Accurate Are Regulatory Cost 
Estimates? 1 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at 
http://grist.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/harringtonmorgensternnelson_regulatory_estimates.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note, at 46–
47. 
25 As in the Harrington study, supra note, OMB’s 2005 report used the term “accurate” to mean 
“that the post-regulation estimate is within +/– 25 percent of the pre-regulation estimate.” Id. at 
42. 
26 Id. at 47. 	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actually doing. It is an astonishing fact that until very recently, there has been no 
sustained effort to gather, let alone act on, that information – and that existing efforts 
remain preliminary and partial. Such an effort might well help agencies to simplify the 
system by eliminating unjustified burdens and a great deal of pointless red tape. 
 
A. The Problem of Cumulative Burdens 
 
A special problem, and one that makes the project of simplification all the more 
imperative, is that agencies currently impose high cumulative burdens on the private 
sector. Requirements may be sensible taken individually, but taken as a whole, they 
might be redundant, inconsistent, overlapping, and immensely frustrating, even crazy-
making (to use the technical term). In fact the problem of cumulative burdens may have 
been the most common complaint that I heard during my time in government. Why, 
people asked, cannot agencies coordinate with one another, or simplify their own 
overlapping requirements, or work together with state and local government, so that we 
do not have to do the same thing twice, or five times, or ten times? This question was 
raised by multiple actors, including state and local governments and small businesses, 
and it did not have any kind of partisan valence. 
 
It is important to distinguish the concept of cumulative burdens from that of 
aggregate burdens. One rule might cost $100 million, and another $200 million, and yet 
another $300 million; those costs can easily be aggregated. With respects to benefits, the 
aggregate of benefits is similarly straightforward. So long as the aggregates are accurate, 
the questions of costs and benefits are symmetrical. But the concept of cumulative 
burdens is different. It points not to a simple aggregation, but to the fact that if a public 
official, a small business, or an individual is asked to engage in tasks A, B, C, and D, 
there may be little room for other tasks, simply because of the scarcity of time.
27 The 
opportunity costs of a large set of overlapping, inconsistent, or redundant rules might turn 
out to be large. In principle, a competent analysis of costs might be able to capture those 
costs, but it is exceedingly hard to do so in the context of particular rules. I issued a 
guidance document designed to draw attention to cumulative burdens and to reduce 
them,
28 but it must be acknowledged that thus project remains a work in progress. 
Particular goals should be to engage with affected parties in advance of proposed 
rulemaking; to harmonize inconsistent or redundant requirements; and to consider 
whether federal regulation is needed in light of requirements at the state and local levels. 
 
Some business groups objected to cumulative burdens while focusing particularly 
on the need for international regulatory cooperation. They contended that just as it makes 
no sense to have to meet redundant requirements from the federal government and 
California and Georgia and New York, it is also senseless for companies to have to 
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27 On the general topic, see SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY 
HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013). 
28 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Regulatory 
Affairs, on Cumulative Effects of Regulations to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 
20, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/cumulative-effects-
guidance.pdf. 	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absorb and meet complex and overlapping requirements from the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, the United Kingdom, and France. If nations do not really disagree about facts or 
values, should they not attempt to harmonize their requirements, if only to promote trade 
and growth? One representative of a large business organization went so far as to say to 
me, early on, that while domestic regulation from the Obama administration was a 
concern, the problem of unnecessary international differences was a much larger one, and 
that if we could do something to reduce that problem, we would make a major 
contribution. When I worked in government, we took these concerns very seriously.
29  
 
B. Retrospective Analysis 
 
In January 2011, focusing directly on the issue of simplification, President Obama 
called for a government-wide “retrospective analysis” of existing rules and required 
agencies to produce, in short order, preliminary plans for such analysis.
30 If it is firmly 
institutionalized,
31 the requirement of retrospective analysis might well count as the most 
important structural change in regulatory policy since the original requirement of 
prospective analysis during the Reagan Administration.
32  
 
Motivated above all by the general goal of streamlining the regulatory system, the 
requirement had a particular origin. In the midst of a serious economic crisis, there was a 
great deal of interest, within the Executive Office of the President, in taking all 
reasonable steps to promote economic growth. Eliminating costly regulatory burdens 
certainly counts as such a step. At the same time, everyone knows that during the first 
term of the Obama administration, Congress enacted and the president signed the 
Affordable Care Act, perhaps the most important social legislation since the 1960s.
33 
Also during the first term, Congress enacted and the president signed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amounted to the most important 
financial legislation since the 1930s.
34 And while we focused on net benefits and tried to 
keep costs down, we also issued a number of important rules to protect public safety, 
health, and the environment. Some of those rules were both contentious and expensive, 
and it must be acknowledge that they were not exactly simple.
35 
 
At the same time that we moved forward in these ways, we believed that in a 
difficult economic period, there was a pressing need to eliminate unjustified requirements 
and to reassess rules on the books. Doing so, we knew, would be a significant step toward 
making the whole system simpler, and could have substantial beneficial effects on the 
economy. We also heard this suggestion, loud and clear, from businesses both large and 
small. Some expensive rules, even if well-motivated when issued, probably never made a 
great deal of sense. Some old rules, sensible when issued, do not make sense today. 
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29 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
30 See Exec. Order 13,563. 
31 As is the goal of Exec. Order 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2012). See Appendix. 
32 See Exec. Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
33 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
34 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
35 For a catalogue, see Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note. 	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Changed circumstances can make rules ripe for reassessment and trimming, or maybe 
deletion. Perhaps new technologies make such rules obsolete. Perhaps there is a problem 
of redundancy and overlap. Perhaps states are also imposing requirements, and federal 
regulations are no longer needed. Perhaps the private market is now working well 
enough, and old regulations no longer have a point, because there is no market failure for 
them to address. 
 
Consider this important suggestion from the MIT economist Michael Greenstone, 
former chief economist at the Council of Economic Advisers: “The single greatest 
problem with the current system is that most regulations are subject to a cost-benefit 
analysis only in advance of their implementation. This is the point when the least is 
known and any analysis must rest on many unverifiable and potentially controversial 
assumptions.”
36 By contrast, retrospective analysis can help show what actually works 
and what does not. In the process, it can promote the repeal or streamlining of less 
effective rules and the strengthening or expansion of those that turn out to do more good 
than harm. In a valuable essay, Greenstone outlines a series of ambitious reforms 
designed to promote a culture of experimentation and evaluation.
37 These reforms include 
an effort to ensure that regulations are written and implemented so as to facilitate reliable 
evaluation.  
 
In my own experience—and I know that Greenstone agrees—agencies are highly 
professional, and they work hard to get the analysis right. Those who do the analysis are 
civil servants, not political appointees. They may be responsive, in appropriate ways, to 
their department’s political leadership, but that responsiveness does not compromise their 
efforts to produce sound analysis (which is very much in the interest of any 
administration, in part because it can avoid political embarrassment, and in part because 
it can reduce the risk of judicial invalidation). In addition, there are many checks on what 
agencies do. If an agency’s estimates are doubtful, OIRA will raise questions, as will the 
Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, the Office of Scientific 
and Technology Policy, and others.
38 On numerous occasions, the agency’s draft analysis 
of costs and benefits is altered and improved because of this process of close scrutiny.
39 
And if an agency proposes a rule with an implausible or doubtful analysis, members of 
the public will raise questions, and those questions will receive a serious hearing.
40 
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36 Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and 
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 113, 113 (David Moss & John Cisterno eds., 
2009).  
37 Id. 
38 For discussion, see Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, supra note. 
39 See, e.g., id. at 1847 (reporting that 76% of rules sent to OIRA during a two-and-a-half year 
period were approved “consistent with change”); John D. Graham et. al., Managing the 
Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 971-
74 (2006). 
40 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); Sunstein, The Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, supra note, at 1863 (discussing the importance of public 
comments). 	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Critics frequently neglect these safeguards,
41 which often produce significant changes in 
the agency’s original analysis. I saw many such cases. 
 
But Greenstone’s central point remains. When agencies issue rules, they have to 
speculate about benefits and costs. After rules are in place, they should test those 
speculations, and they should use what they learn when revisiting a regulation or issuing 
a new one. This is a central point for the future of regulatory reform. Indeed, it is one of 
the most important steps imaginable, not least because it can reduce cumulative burdens 
and promote the goal of simplification. 
 
IV. The Regulatory Lookback in Action 
 
After the issuance of Executive Order 13,563, the initial step was the production 
of preliminary plans for retrospective review, which the president required within 120 
days.
42 This was an aggressive timeline, especially considering the fact that public 
officials have numerous things to do. Many agencies began by asking for suggestions 
from the public, requesting ideas about which regulations must needed to be revisited.. 
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Commerce, 
Transportation, Interior, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury posted notices in the 
Federal Register, asking for comments about how the process should work and which 
rules should be streamlined or repealed.




In the early days of the process, there was a great deal of skepticism about the 
president’s initiative, certainly outside of government. Critics in the business community 
contended that this was a symbolic exercise that was unlikely to produce anything 
significant or real.
45 Those in the public interest community agreed. They added that the 
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41 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) 
(analogizing public comments to rulemaking to “Japanese Kabuki theater” because they are 
merely symbolic, while admitting that the public can still have influence through other methods, 
including informal meetings). 
42 Exec. Order 13,563 § 6(b). 
43 See, e.g., Retrospective Review Under E.O. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 17,572 (Mar. 30, 2011) 
(Department of the Treasury). 
44
 See, e.g., U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, IMPROVING OUR REGULATIONS: A PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR 
PERIODIC RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF EXISTING REGULATIONS 34 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2011-regulatory-action-
plans/EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyPreliminaryRegulatoryReformPlan.pdf (“Verbal comments 
were solicited at a series of twenty public meetings. . . . Additionally, EPA held nineteen more town 
halls and listening sessions targeting specific program areas (e.g. solid waste and emergency response) 
and EPA Regions.”). 
45 See, e.g., The Views of the Administration on Regulatory Reform: An Update Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th 
Cong. 54, 67 (2011) (statement of William Kovacs, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce) (saying that while the Obama Administration’s regulatory lookback was “a very 
positive first step . . . we have got a long way to go,” and “in the case of EPA, its look-back does 	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idea of a regulatory lookback was a distraction from what was important, which was to 
look forward by issuing long-overdue public safeguards.
46 But within the government 
itself, President Obama’s clear commitment to the project, expressed in his 2011 State of 
the Union Address
47 and in highly publicized remarks to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce,
48 had a significant impact. 
 
Throughout the federal government, agencies were energized. A number of 
officials, at a wide range of agencies, had long wanted to engage in an initiative of this 
sort, but time is limited and officials have to set priorities. Now the president himself had 
directed them to act. The lookback requirement gave real space to officials who were 
already excited about the basic idea, and for officials who had not thought about it, the 




In May 2011, the agencies released their preliminary plans, identifying hundreds 
of reforms, many of which would streamline or delete regulatory requirements. 
Recognizing the importance of public participation, every agency made these plans 
publicly available and requested comments and suggestions.
50 I issued a guidance 
document, which is binding on agencies, directing them to address the comments they 
received and to make their plans final within eighty days.
51 
 
Twenty-six such plans were issued in August 2011. They included over 580 
initiatives, filling more than eight hundred pages. The initiatives promise billions of 
dollars of savings and tens of millions of hours of reductions in annual paperwork and 
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little to nothing in the way of addressing the bulk of rulemakings of significant concern to the 
Chamber and its members”). 
46 See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch), Federal 
Agencies Release Retrospective Reviews: Preliminary Plans Appear Reasonable, But Proof will 
be Final Product, (May 26, 2011), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11683 (expressing the 
concern that “the more agencies look back the less they will be able to look forward,” while also 
noting positive aspects of the review). 
47 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-
state-union-address. 
48 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 7, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/07/remarks-president-
chamber-commerce. 
49 See Kori Schulman, A 21st Century Regulatory System, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 26, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/26/21st-century-regulatory-system (announcing 
the completion of preliminary plans from all agencies). 
50
 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Regulatory 
Affairs, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Retrospective Analysis of Existing 
Significant Regulations (Apr. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-19.pdf. 
51 Id. 	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reporting requirements.
52 Within a short period, over a hundred of the initiatives were 
finalized or formally proposed to the public.
53  
 
One of these enjoyed short-term fame, not only because it eliminated unnecessary 
costs but because it had the dubious honor of being the most twittered moment of the 
2012 State of the Union Address.
54 It took a village, but I share the responsibility for that 
particular honor.  
 
Since the 1970s, milk had been defined by law as an “oil” and potentially subject 
to costly rules designed to prevent oil spills. This was silly. While oil spills can be really 
bad for the environment, milk spills are pretty innocuous, and they really should not be 
subject to the same restrictions. (As one skeptic said, people don’t confuse “Got Milk?” 
with “Got Oil?”) The agricultural community, including many small businesses, had long 
asked the EPA to repeal these restrictions. As a key part of its retrospective review plan, 
EPA concluded that the regulatory requirements placed unjustifiable burdens on dairy 




Inside the government we liked to say, a bit sheepishly (and maybe with a trace of 
self-loathing), that this deregulatory initiative gave new meaning to the phrase “Don’t cry 
over spilled milk.” The president made a joke in this vein in his State of the Union 
Address. People groaned a lot -- hence the twittering. 
 
Here are just a few other examples, none of which easily gives rise to any kind of 
joke, but each of which is having a real impact: 
 
•  The Department of Health and Human Services finalized several 
rules to remove unnecessary regulatory and reporting requirements 
previously imposed on hospitals and other health care providers, thus 
saving about $5 billion over the next five years.
56 These streamlining 
initiatives were received with great enthusiasm by nurses and doctors, who 
had long urged the government to eliminate pointless red tape. 
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 The final plans can be viewed on the White House’s website. Regulation Reform, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/21stcenturygov/actions/21st-century-regulatory-system (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
53 See Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 58 
(2013), available at http://jreg.commons.yale.edu/files/2013/06/Moving-Forward-with-
Regulatory-Look-Back-final.pdf. 
54 Some Sour Over ‘Spilled Milk’ Line in State of the Union Address, NBC POLITICS ON 
NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/25/10229627-
some-sour-over-spilled-milk-line-in-state-of-the-union-address. 
55
 U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, supra note 44, at 13. 
56
 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING RULES 3, 
8–17 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-
action-plans/healthandhumanservicesregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf. 	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•  HHS finalized a rule to eliminate certain restrictions on the use of 
telemedicine,
57 particularly helping hospitals in rural areas. This rule 
provides a significant benefit to patients as well as doctors. By removing 
an anachronistic restriction, people in rural areas can now get quality care 
with the aid of computers and telephones. The five-year savings are $67 
million, and the dollar figure does not fully capture the benefits that 
doctors and patients are receiving. 
 
•  The Department of Labor finalized a rule to harmonize hazard 
warnings for workers with those of other nations, producing savings in 
excess of $2.5 billion over the next five years, most of it for employers.
58 
The basic idea is that many employers do business in more than one 
nation, and if they have to alter their hazard warnings whenever they cross 
national borders, they will incur pointless costs. (Recall the importance of 
international regulatory cooperation.) A significant advantage of this rule 
is that it promotes trade and exports. In addition, the new warnings are 
simpler and easier to understand, and lives are expected to be saved as a 
result. 
 
•  The Department of Transportation finalized a rule to simplify a 
railroad safety regulation, producing savings of between $620 million and 




•  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued a final 
rule to remove over 1.9 million annual hours of redundant reporting 




•  EPA finalized a rule to eliminate the requirement, imposed in some 
states, that gas stations place air pollution controls on the nozzles that 
people use to put gas into their tanks. Because modern cars and trucks 
already have effective air pollution control technologies, the required 
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57 Changes Affecting Hospital and Critical Access Hospital Conditions of Participation: 
Telemedicine Credentialing and Privileging, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,550 (May 5, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pts. 482, 485). 
58




 Positive Train Control Systems, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,285 (May 14, 2012) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 236). 
60
 Standards Improvement Project, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,590 (June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pts. 1910, 1915, 1917-19, 1926, 1928) 
Matthew Lipka  11/25/13 10:29 PM
Comment [1]: Note that because this is not 
a major rule the savings figure isn’t currently 
in any official public document, so I cannot 
confirm it. The only place I’ve seen this 
number is in Simpler. 	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controls were redundant and could be eliminated without increasing 
pollution. The anticipated five-year savings are about $300 million.
61 
 
•  The Departments of Commerce and State undertook a series of 
steps to eliminate barriers to exports, including duplicative and 
unnecessary regulatory requirements, thus reducing the cumulative burden 
and uncertainty faced by American companies and their trading partners.
62  
 
A small subset of these initiatives, already finalized or formally proposed to the 
public, will produce savings of more than $10 billion over the next five years.
63 This 
figure is a small fraction of the eventual savings. Many of the lookback initiatives also 
provide benefits that are hard to monetize but likely to be significant. For example, it is 
not easy to quantify the economic benefits, including the jobs created, of reducing 
restrictions on exports and simplifying the requirements imposed on those who do 
business across national borders. Nonetheless, those benefits are expected to be high.
64 
 
V. Toward a Culture of Retrospective Analysis 
 
A.  A One-Time Endeavor? 
 
After the plans were finalized, we did a great deal to try to create a culture of 
retrospective analysis rather than just a one-time endeavor. In 2012, the president issued 
an Executive Order with three key components.
65 First, agencies are required to reach out 
to the public, on a continuing basis, to solicit ideas about reforms. Second, agencies must 
give priority to reforms that would have a significant impact -- for example, those with 
big economic savings. New initiatives should make a real difference; they should not be 
symbolic measures or mere updating. Third, and perhaps most important, agencies have 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61
 Widespread Use for Onboard Refueling Vapor Recovery, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,772 (May 16, 2012) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
62
 DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RULES 3–6 (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-action-
plans/departmentofcommerceregulatoryreformplanaugust2011a.pdf. 
63 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., SMARTER REGULATIONS 
THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/lookback_report_rev_final.pdf. 
64 There is a large question about the extent to which independent agencies should be required to 
engage a similar regulatory lookback. In Executive Order 13,579, President Obama said that they 
“should” do so, without explicitly directing them to engage in that process. Independent agencies 
generally did what the President said that they “should” do, though their efforts were less 
ambitious than those of the executive agencies. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REGULATORY 
REVIEW PLAN: ENSURING FTC RULES ARE UP-TO-DATE, EFFECTIVE, AND NOT OVERLY 
BURDENSOME (2011), available at http://ftc.gov/ftc/regreview/regreviewplan.pdf; FED. 
COMMC’N COMM’N, FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RULES (2012), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314166A1.pdf; R.R. RET. 
BD., REGULATION AND REGULATORY REVIEW: RRB ACTION PLAN, available at 
http://www.rrb.gov/pdf/blaw/EO13579.pdf.  
65 Exec. Order 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2012). 	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to report on their progress to OIRA and to the public on a continuing basis. This final step 
is designed to promote accountability -- to ensure that if agencies are not doing much, the 
public will be able to see that and provide a corrective. Here, as elsewhere, we attempted 
to enlist sunlight as a check on drift and inaction. All of these steps can be understood as 




B.  International Regulatory Cooperation 
 
Also in 2012, the president issued an Executive Order designed to reduce 
excessive costs and to increase simplification by promoting international regulatory 
cooperation.
67 The Executive Order explicitly links the lookback to such cooperation, 
calling for initiatives that will reduce costs and simplify the system by eliminating 
unnecessary disparities across nations.  
 
There is a great deal more to do in this area, removing barriers to growth and 
trade. Through the work of the Regulatory Cooperation Council that I co-chaired, Canada 
and the United States have worked productively together to do exactly that,
68 and we 
made significant progress with Mexico too.
69 Further steps, with considerable promise, 
might well involve Europe, which should be engaging in a lookback of its own.
70 
International regulatory cooperation and reduction of cumulative burdens remain high 





As an additional step, I directed agencies to undertake significant new initiatives 
to eliminate reporting and paperwork burdens. I called for simplified applications, short-
form options, exemptions or streamlining for small business, electronic filing, and 
elimination of unnecessary requirements.
71 More specifically, I directed the agencies that 
now impose the highest paperwork burdens to identify at least one initiative, or 
combination of initiatives, that would eliminate two million hours or more in annual 
reporting burdens. I also directed all agencies to identify at least one initiative, or 
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66 On the basic idea, see Sunstein, Simpler, supra note *. 
67 Exec. Order 13,609, 3 C.F.R. 255 (2012). 
68 See REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL, JOINT ACTION PLAN (2011), available at 
http://actionplan.gc.ca/sites/default/files/japlan_eng.pdf. 
69 Relevant documents can be found at United States-Mexico High-level Regulatory Cooperation 
Council, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_north_america#mexico 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
70 See generally United States-European Union High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, THE 
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
71 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Regulatory 
Affairs, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Reducing Reporting and 
Paperwork Burdens (June 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/memos/reducing-reporting-and-
paperwork-burdens.pdf. 	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combination of initiatives, that would eliminate at least fifty thousand hours in annual 




As it happens, the Department of Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service in 
particular, are responsible for nearly three-quarters of the total annual paperwork burden 
placed on the American people.
73 As many taxpayers reminded me while I was at OIRA, 
there are many opportunities here for making things easier and less frustrating. Often 
working with OIRA, the IRS has already done a great deal to simplify its forms -- for 
example, with Form 1040 EZ and with the growth of electronic filing.
74 Other “EZ” 
forms are now available and in use, and they are greatly easing people’s burdens.
75 The 
Plain Writing Act of 2010 should help to promote clarity, because it is designed to ensure 




D. Expanding Regulation? 
 
The lookback has been focused, above all, on streamlining and eliminating rules, 
in part to reduce cumulative burdens. The president’s 2011 Executive Order has the same 
emphasis, but it explicitly acknowledges that agencies may “expand” their regulations if 
retrospective analysis supports that step.
77 We can easily imagine why this might be so—
and why a careful lookback could justify expansion as well as elimination of rules. An 
agency might learn that a rule costs a great deal less than was anticipated and that more 
stringency is required by cost-benefit analysis. Or an agency might learn that with new 
technologies—electronic rather than paper reporting, for example—compliance is 
inexpensive and easy, and an exemption of (say) small businesses is no longer warranted. 
Or an agency might learn that a rule is working quite well, but that its coverage is too 
narrow, and more people should be subject to it.  
 
All of these points are right and even important, but in the lookback process we 
did not emphasize them, and I do not expect that they will be the emphasis in the future. 
The reason is that in the Obama administration, most agencies were already working 
diligently to fill regulatory gaps, to expand regulatory safeguards, and to build on what 
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72 OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRES., INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 16-20 (2012), available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/icb_2012.pdf 
73 Id. at v. 
74 See Choose the Simplest Tax Form for Your Situation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 5, 
2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Choose-the-Simplest-Tax-Form-for-Your-Situation. 
75 E.g., Form 990-EZ, Short Form Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, Short Form 
Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ez.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
76 See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. and Regulatory 
Affairs, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Final Guidance on Implementing 
the Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-15.pdf. 
77 See Exec. Order 13,563, § 6. 	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was working. They did not need the lookback to engage in that endeavor. Gap-filling and 
increased protection are exceedingly important, but for this initiative, we found it best to 
focus on streamlining and burden reduction, not on gap-filling. While expansion is not 
off the table, simplification has been and will continue to be the principal concern. 
 
One final point: It is ironic but true that procedural safeguards, designed to 
discipline the rulemaking process, create significant barriers to the project of 
simplification and indeed to the regulatory lookback. Changes in existing rules must be 
subject to the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
78 as well as 
to judicial review and the OIRA review process.
79 Whether or not these safeguards are 
excessive, optimal, or insufficient, they do ensure that the regulatory lookback is not as 
expeditious as many would like. Rules may be excessive or unjustified, but in most cases, 
their simplification and repeal requires use of a time-consuming process. 
 
VI. Experiments and Trials 
 
To get the facts right, it is important to engage in far more evaluation and 
experimentation. This is not a point about retrospective review, but it is closely related. It 
is a central part of the future of reform not only of regulation but of policymaking in 
general. 
 
In the past decade there has been growing interest in the use of randomized 
controlled trials as a means of learning the effects of policy initiatives.
80 In medicine, of 
course, it is standard to rely on such trials to see if a drug is safe and effective. For drugs, 
it would not make a great deal of sense simply to guess, to rely on informed hunches, or 
even to make simple “before and after” assessments. Suppose that we learn that people 
who use a certain asthma medicine do better after taking the medicine than before. If so, 
we know something important—but we do not know nearly enough. The risk with 
before-and-after assessments is that they may not control for confounding variables. 
Perhaps people are doing better because of some change in the environment that is not 
adequately understood by those who are making the assessment.  
 
In the medical domain, the value of randomized controlled experiments is that 
they have the potential to provide a clear sense of the actual effects of the intervention. 
Esther Duflo, along with many others, has pioneered the use of randomized controlled 
trials for purposes of policy evaluation. Duflo has shown that in many cases, small 
measures, even nudges, can have big effects, especially in helping poor people.
81 
 
In the regulatory area, the use of such trials remains in a preliminary state. 
Analysis of costs and benefits is rarely informed by them. But it is easy to imagine 
serious evaluations. Consider a few examples: 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
78 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (defining “rule making” as “agency process 
for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule”). 
79 See Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, supra note. 
80 See generally ABHIJIT BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS (2011). 
81 See id. 	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•  Would states really save lives by banning use of cell phones while 
driving? This is a disputed question. Laboratory experiments, showing that 
people’s reaction times slow down when they are distracted, strongly suggest that 
the answer is yes, and indeed that driving while talking on a phone is a bit like 
driving while drunk, producing a fourfold increase in relative crash risk.
82 But 
maybe those experiments are an unreliable guide to the real world. We could test 
whether a ban on cell phone use would have major effects on safety by comparing 
similarly situated localities, one with such a ban and one without. Or we could test 
whether accidents increase in periods in which cell phone use goes up -- for 
example, when rates decrease after 9 p.m.
83  
 
•  What are the effects of different methods of increasing rear visibility in 
cars? If cameras are placed in the dashboard, do accidents drop? How much, and 
compared to what? Do improved mirrors have an effect? What about sonar 
devices, making beeping noises? Do they work as well as cameras?
84 Randomized 
trials might help. 
 
•  It is important to evaluate different disclosure requirements.
85 We might 
test whether different fuel economy labels have different effects on similarly 
situated consumers.
86 Does one label produce different choices? How different? If 
labels draw attention to annual fuel costs, are people affected? Do people care 
about environmental factors? How much? The same kinds of questions might be 
asked about disclosure requirements for credit cards, mortgages, cell phones, and 
school loans. 
 
In important areas, experimentation might take the form of advance testing of 
regulatory alternatives through randomized controlled trials. A movement in this 
direction would have major advantages over current approaches, such as focus groups, 
which are often highly artificial and which sometimes test what people like rather than 
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82 See CHARLOTTE L. BRACE ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE: THE USE OF MOBILE 
PHONES WHILE DRIVING (2007), available at 
http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/Resources/Documents/Analysis%20of%20the%20Literature,
%20The%20Use%20of%20Mobile%20Phones%20While%20Driving.pdf.  
83 See Saurabh Bhargava & Vikram Pathania, Driving Under the (Cellular) Influence: The Link 
Between Cell Phone Use and Vehicle Crashes 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY 92, available at 
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.5.3.92. 
84 Cf. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186 (Dec. 7, 
2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
85 For an overview, see George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything, 
Annual Review of Economics (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2312708 
86 See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 
39,482-83 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, 49 C.F.R. pt. 575). 	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what they would actually do.
87 A presentation might be pleasing without having much of 
an effect on what people understand and do.  
 
In the United Kingdom, there has been a great deal of interest in using 
randomized controlled trials, above all through the work of the Behavioral Insights Team 
(sometimes called the Nudge Unit).
88 Related efforts should be made in the United States 
and elsewhere.
89 If randomized trials are not feasible, we might be able to design 
experiments that replicate actual behavior by asking people concrete questions about 
what they would do if provided with certain information or if given a range of options. 
The current fuel economy label was based on tests of this kind.
90 But such experiments 
are second-best. Randomized controlled trials deserve pride of place.
91 
 
Of course there are constraints—involving not merely law but also resources and 
feasibility (and perhaps equity as well)—in using randomized controlled trials in the 
regulatory context. But in some cases, they would be both appropriate and useful. The 
agencies’ retrospective review plans show an unambiguous commitment to moving in 
this direction. The Department of Treasury states that it will work to “develop and 
incorporate experimental designs into retrospective analysis, when appropriate.”
92 The 
Department of Labor states that it “is contemplating how to incorporate the use of 
experimental designs to determine the impact of various regulations.”
93 The Department 
of Interior states that it will consider the use of “experimental or quasi-experimental 
designs, including randomized controlled trials.”
94 We should expect far more progress in 
the future. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
87 See Robert J. Johnston et al., Contingent Valuation Focus Groups: Insights From Ethnographic 
Interview Techniques, 24 AGRIC. AND RESOURCE ECON. REV. 56, 56-57 (1995) (summarizing 
numerous ways that bias can be introduced with focus groups, including the risk that “questions 
can elicit speculative responses not closely linked to behavior”). 
88 See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team, which provides 
many valuable examples. 
89 See Duncan Watts, Everything is Obvious (2011); Jim Manzi, Uncontrolled: The Surprising 
Payoff of Trial-and-Error for Business, Politics, and Society (2012). 
90 See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. at 39,483. 
91 See id. at 39,483 n.25. 
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 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING 
RULES 22 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2011-regulatory-
action-plans/DepartmentofLaborPreliminaryRegulatoryReformPlan.pdf. 
94
 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REGULATORY REVIEW 19, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2011-regulatory-action-
plans/DepartmentoftheInteriorPreliminaryRegulatoryReformPlan.pdf. See also U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRICULTURE, FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13563, at 23 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-
regulatory-action-plans/departmentofagricultureregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf (“[The 
USDA] may consider the use of experimental or quasi-experimental designs, including 




Discussions of political dysfunction tend to focus on high-profile controversies 
and disputes. Such discussion neglects much of the real work of government, which is 
often not highly publicized, but which has a significant impact on people’s lives, and 
which is anything but dysfunctional.  
 
While in government, I was struck, every day, by the contrast between the one or 
two grand narratives that dominate the political headlines (and also the concerns and 
preoccupations of the most informed observers) and the less dramatic, usually smaller, 
but nonetheless important matters that dominate the day-to-day work of most people in 
government. The grand narratives were largely irrelevant to the less dramatic matters. 
The latter should not be disparaged. They have major effects, and they receive little 
attention precisely because they are not contentious across political divides. Efforts to 
simplify government are central examples. 
 
With respect to the regulatory lookback, a great deal remains to be done. What is 
needed is a genuine culture of retrospective analysis, in which agencies stand ready and 
willing to improve and simplify rules completed decades ago, or years ago, or months 
ago, or even weeks ago. Well-functioning companies are flexible and adaptive. They 
learn in real time. The same should be true of government. 
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Appendix:  
Executive Order 13,610 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, and in order to modernize our regulatory system and to reduce 
unjustified regulatory burdens and costs, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
 
Section 1. Policy. Regulations play an indispensable role in protecting public 
health, welfare, safety, and our environment, but they can also impose significant burdens 
and costs. During challenging economic times, we should be especially careful not to 
impose unjustified regulatory requirements. For this reason, it is particularly important 
for agencies to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether they 
remain justified and whether they should be modified or streamlined in light of changed 
circumstances, including the rise of new technologies. 
 
Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011 (Improving Regulation and Regu- 
latory Review), states that our regulatory system ‘‘must measure, and seek to improve, 
the actual results of regulatory requirements.’’ To promote this goal, that Executive Order 
requires agencies not merely to conduct a single exercise, but to engage in ‘‘periodic 
review of existing significant regulations.’’ Pursuant to section 6(b) of that Executive 
Order, agencies are required to develop retrospective review plans to review existing 
significant regulations in order to ‘‘determine whether any such regulations should be 
modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.’’ The purpose of this requirement is to 
‘‘make the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving 
the regulatory objectives.’’ 
 
In response to Executive Order 13563, agencies have developed and made 
available for public comment retrospective review plans that identify over five hundred 
initiatives. A small fraction of those initiatives, already finalized or formally proposed to 
the public, are anticipated to eliminate billions of dollars in regulatory costs and tens of 
millions of hours in annual paperwork burdens. Significantly larger savings are 
anticipated as the plans are implemented and as action is taken on additional initiatives. 
 
As a matter of longstanding practice and to satisfy statutory obligations, many 
agencies engaged in periodic review of existing regulations prior to the issuance of 
Executive Order 13563. But further steps should be taken, consistent with law, agency 
resources, and regulatory priorities, to promote public participation in retrospective 
review, to modernize our regulatory system, and to institutionalize regular assessment of 
significant regulations. 
 
Sec. 2. Public Participation in Retrospective Review. Members of the public, 
including those directly and indirectly affected by regulations, as well as State, local, and 
tribal governments, have important information about the actual effects of existing 
regulations. For this reason, and consistent with Executive Order 13563, agencies shall 
invite, on a regular basis (to be determined by the agency head in consultation with the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)), public suggestions about 	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regulations in need of retrospective review and about appropriate modifications to such 
regulations. To promote an open exchange of information, retrospective analyses of 
regulations, including supporting data, shall be released to the public online wherever 
practicable. 
 
Sec. 3. Setting Priorities. In implementing and improving their retrospective 
review plans, and in considering retrospective review suggestions from the public, 
agencies shall give priority, consistent with law, to those initiatives that will produce 
significant quantifiable monetary savings or significant quantifiable reductions in 
paperwork burdens while protecting public health, welfare, safety, and our environment. 
To the extent practicable and permitted by law, agencies shall also give special 
consideration to initiatives that would reduce unjustified regulatory burdens or simplify 
or harmonize regulatory requirements imposed on small businesses. Consistent with 
Executive Order 13563 and Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993 (Regulatory 
Planning and Review), agencies shall give consideration to the cumulative effects of their 
own regulations, including cumulative burdens, and shall to the extent practicable and 
consistent with law give priority to reforms that would make significant progress in 
reducing those burdens while protecting public health, welfare, safety, and our 
environment. 
 
Sec. 4. Accountability. Agencies shall regularly report on the status of their 
retrospective review efforts to OIRA. Agency reports should describe progress, 
anticipated accomplishments, and proposed timelines for relevant actions, with an 
emphasis on the priorities described in section 3 of this order. Agencies shall submit draft 
reports to OIRA on September 10, 2012, and on the second Monday of January and July 
for each year thereafter, unless directed otherwise through subsequent guidance from 
OIRA. Agencies shall make final reports available to the public within a reasonable 
period (not to exceed three weeks from the date of submission of draft reports to OIRA). 	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